MACsec, defined in 802.1AE, provides MAC-layer encryption over wired networks by using out-of-band methods for encryption
keying. The MACsec Key Agreement (MKA) Protocol provides the required session keys and manages the required encryption keys.
MKA and MACsec are implemented after successful authentication using certificate-based MACsec or Pre Shared Key (PSK) framework.
A device using MACsec accepts either MACsec or non-MACsec frames, depending on the policy associated with the MKA peer. MACsec
frames are encrypted and protected with an integrity check value (ICV). When the device receives frames from the MKA peer,
it decrypts them and calculates the correct ICV by using session keys provided by MKA. The device compares that ICV to the
ICV within the frame. If they are not identical, the frame is dropped. The device also encrypts and adds an ICV to any frames
sent over the secured port (the access point used to provide the secure MAC service to a MKA peer) using the current session
key.
The MKA Protocol manages the encryption keys used by the underlying MACsec protocol. The basic requirements of MKA are defined
in 802.1x-REV. The MKA Protocol extends 802.1x to allow peer discovery with confirmation of mutual authentication and sharing
of MACsec secret keys to protect data exchanged by the peers.
The EAP framework implements MKA as a newly defined EAP-over-LAN (EAPOL) packet. EAP authentication produces a master session
key (MSK) shared by both partners in the data exchange. Entering the EAP session ID generates a secure connectivity association
key name (CKN). The device acts as the key server for both uplink and downlink; and acts as the authenticator for downlink.
It generates a random secure association key (SAK), which is sent to the client partner. The client is never a key server
and can only interact with a single MKA entity, the key server. After key derivation and generation, the device sends periodic
transports to the partner at a default interval of 2 seconds.
The packet body in an EAPOL Protocol Data Unit (PDU) is referred to as a MACsec Key Agreement PDU (MKPDU). MKA sessions and
participants are deleted when the MKA lifetime (6 seconds) passes with no MKPDU received from a participant. For example,
if a MKA peer disconnects, the participant on the device continues to operate MKA until 6 seconds have elapsed after the last
MKPDU is received from the MKA peer.
Note
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Integrity check value (ICV) indicator in MKPDU is optional. ICV is not optional when the traffic is encrypted.
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EAPoL Announcements indicate the use of the type of keying material. The announcements can be used to announce the capability
of the supplicant as well as the authenticator. Based on the capability of each side, the largest common denominator of the
keying material could be used.