Security and VPN Configuration Guide, Cisco IOS XE 17.x
Bias-Free Language
The documentation set for this product strives to use bias-free language. For the purposes of this documentation set, bias-free is defined as language that does not imply discrimination based on age, disability, gender, racial identity, ethnic identity, sexual orientation, socioeconomic status, and intersectionality. Exceptions may be present in the documentation due to language that is hardcoded in the user interfaces of the product software, language used based on RFP documentation, or language that is used by a referenced third-party product. Learn more about how Cisco is using Inclusive Language.
Configuring Quantum-Safe Encryption Using Postquantum Preshared Keys
This module describes quantum-safe encryption using Postquantum Preshared Keys (PPK). This feature implements RFC 8784 and
Cisco Secure Key Integration Protocol (SKIP) for quantum-safe encryption of IKEv2 and IPsec packets using PPKs.
Restrictions for Quantum-Safe Encryption Using Postquantum Preshared Keys
The Quantum-Safe Encryption Using Postquantum Preshared Keys feature is applicable to all IKEv2 and IPsec VPNs such as, FlexVPN
(SVTI-DVTI) and DMVPN, except for GETVPN.
When you configure PPK using SKIP, the key source should send the key format in the hex format.
Supported Platforms
The Quantum-Safe Encryption Using Postquantum Preshared Keys feature is available on the following platforms:
From Cisco IOS XE Release 17.12.1a
From Cisco IOS XE Release 17.11.1a
Cisco 1000 Series Integrated Services Routers
Cisco Catalyst 8000V Edge Software
Cisco Catalyst 8500 Series Edge Platforms
Cisco Catalyst 8300 Series Edge Platforms
Cisco ASR 1000 Series Aggregation Services Routers
Information About Quantum-Safe Encryption Using Postquantum Preshared Keys
The following sections provide detailed information relating to the Quantum-Safe Encryption Using Postquantum Preshared Keys
feature.
Impact of Quantum Computers on Cryptography
Quantum computers pose a serious challenge to the cryptographic algorithms and protocols deployed widely today. A quantum
computer can solve Diffie-Hellman (DH) and Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) problems in polynomial time, and this can
compromise the security of existing IKEv2 systems. A man-in-the-middle storing the VPN communications today can decrypt them
later when a quantum computer is available.
Postquantum Preshared Keys
Session keys that are based on preshared keys are not vulnerable to quantum attacks if the preshared keys have sufficient
entropy and the pseudorandom function (PRF), encryption, and authentication transformations are quantum secure. The resulting
system is then believed to be secure against classical attackers of today or future attackers with a quantum computer.
RFC 8784 (Mixing Preshared Keys in IKEv2 for Postquantum Security) describes an extension to the IKEv2 protocol to allow it
to be resistant to a quantum computer by using preshared keys known as PPKs. The RFC defines negotiation of PPK capability,
communication of PPK ID, mixing of PPK as an additional input in the session key derivation, and optional fallback to non-PPK-based
session.
Figure 1 shows the IKEv2 key derivation with and without PPK.
Manual Postquantum Preshared Keys
The simplest provisioning mechanism to provide the same PPKs on the IKEv2 and IPsec initiator and responder pair is to manually
configure the PPKs on both sides. The PPKs configured manually are known as manual PPKs.
With a manual PPK, the administrator must ensure that the PPK is of sufficient size and entropy and it is rotated frequently.
Figure 2 shows quantum-safe IKEv2 and IPsec session keys with a manual PPK.
Cisco Secure Key Integration Protocol and Dynamic Postquantum Preshared Keys
Cisco SKIP is an HTTPS-based protocol that allows encryption devices such as routers, to import PPKs from an external key
source. The externally imported PPKs known as dynamic PPKs offer the benefits of automated provisioning and refresh and better
entropy of PPKs.
Cisco SKIP uses TLS1.2 with PSK-DHE cipher suite to make the SKIP protocol quantum-safe. The encryption devices must implement
the SKIP client and the external key source must implement the SKIP server.
For an external key source to be SKIP compliant, it must implement the Cisco SKIP protocol and must use an out-of-band synchronization
mechanism to provide the same PPK to the two encryption devices—initiator and responder. The external key source can be a
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) device, software, or cloud-based key source or service.
The external key source must meet the following expectations to be SKIP-compliant:
Must implement SKIP protocol or API, as defined in the Cisco SKIP specification.
Must provide the same PPK to the encryption device pair—initiator and responder—using an out-of-band synchronization mechanism.
Note
Key source vendors, such as QKD vendors, should contact their Cisco representative to implement the Cisco SKIP protocol.
Figure 3 shows quantum-safe IKEv2 and IPsec session keys using dynamic PPK.
The IKEv2 initiator and responder are connected to their local key source and configured with the SKIP client that specifies
the IP address and port of the key source and the preshared key for the TLS1.2 session. The PPK sources are configured with
the SKIP parameters, including the local key source identity and the list of identities of the peer key sources.
The following is a high-level operation of the Cisco SKIP protocol:
The IKEv2 initiator places a request for a PPK from its key source. The key source replies with a PPK and the corresponding
PPK ID.
The initiator-side key source synchronizes the PPK to the responder-side key source using an out-of-band mechanism that is
specific to the type of key source. The IKEv2 initiator communicates the PPK ID to the IKEv2 responder over IKEv2 using the
RFC 8784 extensions.
The IKEv2 responder requests from its key source, the PPK corresponding to the PPK ID received from the IKEv2 initiator. The
key source replies with the PPK corresponding to the PPK ID.
The IKEv2 initiator and responder mix the PPK in the key derivation, as specified in RFC 8784. The resulting IKEv2 and IPsec
session keys are quantum-safe.
How to Configure Quantum-Safe Encryption Using Postquantum Preshared Keys
The following sections describe the processes involved in configuring quantum-safe encryption using postquantum preshared
keys.
Configuring Manual Postquantum Preshared Keys
Perform the following tasks to configure the manual PPK.
Configuring Manual Postquantum Preshared Keys in an IKEv2 Keyring
Follow these steps to configure the manual PPK for one or more peers or groups of peers, in the IKEv2 keyring.
Specify the keyring that has either manual or dynamic PPK configured.
Note
To remove the keyring from the IKEv2 profile, use the nokeyring {aaa | local | ppk} keyring-name command.
Step 3
exit
Example:
Device(config-ikev2-profile)# exit
Exits IKEv2profile configuration mode and returns to global configuration mode.
Step 4
exit
Example:
Device(config)# exit
Exits global configuration mode and enters privileged EXEC mode.
Configuration Examples for Quantum-Safe Encryption Using Postquantum Preshared Keys
The following sections provide detailed configuration examples relating to the configuration of quantum-safe encryption using
PPKs.
Example: Configuring the Manual Postquantum Preshared Keys
Example: Initiator Configuration
The following example shows how to manually configure a PPK for an initiator:
conf t
hostname Router1
!
crypto ikev2 keyring ppk-keyring
peer 1
address 10.10.0.1 255.255.255.0
ppk manual id ppk_id key cisco123
!
crypto ikev2 profile prof
match identity remote address 10.10.0.1
authentication local pre-share key cisco
authentication remote pre-share key cisco
keyring ppk ppk-keyring
!
crypto ipsec profile prof
set ikev2-profile prof
!
interface Tunnel0
ip address 10.10.0.1 255.255.255.0
tunnel source GigabitEthernet1
tunnel destination 10.10.10.1
tunnel protection ipsec profile prof
!
interface GigabitEthernet1
ip address 10.10.10.2 255.255.255.0
no shut
!
Example: Responder Configuration
The following example shows how to manually configure a PPK for a responder:
conf t
hostname Router2
!
crypto ikev2 keyring ppk-keyring
peer 1
address 10.10.0.1 255.255.255.0
ppk manual id ppk_id key cisco
!
crypto ikev2 profile prof
match identity remote address 10.10.0.1
authentication local pre-share key cisco
authentication remote pre-share key cisco
keyring ppk ppk-keyring
!
crypto ipsec profile prof
set ikev2-profile prof
!
interface Tunnel0
ip address 10.10.0.2 255.255.255.0
tunnel source GigabitEthernet1
tunnel destination 10.10.10.2
tunnel protection ipsec profile prof
!
interface GigabitEthernet1
ip address 10.10.0.1 255.255.255.0
no shut
!
Example: Configuring the Dynamic Postquantum Preshared Keys
Example: Initiator Configuration
The following example shows how to configure a dynamic PPK for an initiator:
conf t
hostname Router1
!
crypto skip-client skip-client-cfg
server ipv4 10.10.0.4 port 9991
psk id psk-id1 key 0 cisco123
!
crypto ikev2 keyring ppk-keyring
peer 1
address 10.10.0.1 255.255.255.0
ppk dynamic skip-client-cfg
!
crypto ikev2 profile prof
match identity remote address 10.10.0.1
authentication local pre-share key cisco
authentication remote pre-share key cisco
keyring ppk ppk-keyring
!
crypto ipsec profile prof
set ikev2-profile prof
!
interface Tunnel0
ip address 10.10.0.2 255.255.255.0
tunnel source GigabitEthernet1
tunnel destination 10.10.10.1
tunnel protection ipsec profile prof
!
interface GigabitEthernet1
ip address 10.10.10.2 255.255.255.0
no shut
!
interface GigabitEthernet1
ip address 10.10.10.3 255.255.255.0
no shut
!
Example: Responder Configuration
The following example shows how to configure a dynamic PPK for a responder:
conf t
hostname Router2
!
crypto skip-client skip-client-cfg
server ipv4 10.10.0.4 port 9992
psk id vedge-sim-1 key 0 cisco123
!
crypto ikev2 keyring ppk-keyring
peer 1
address 10.10.0.1 255.255.255.0
ppk dynamic skip-client-cfg
!
crypto ikev2 profile prof
match identity remote address 10.10.0.1
authentication local pre-share key cisco
authentication remote pre-share key cisco
keyring ppk ppk-keyring
!
crypto ipsec profile prof
set ikev2-profile prof
!
interface Tunnel0
ip address 10.10.0.2 255.255.255.0
tunnel source GigabitEthernet1
tunnel destination 10.10.10.2
tunnel protection ipsec profile prof
!
interface GigabitEthernet1
ip address 10.10.10.1 255.255.255.0
no shut
!
interface GigabitEthernet1
ip address 10.10.10.4 255.255.255.0
!
Verifying the Postquantum Preshared Keys Configuration
Use the showcryptoikev2sadetailed command to display information about the current IKEv2 security associations. The Quantum Resistance Enabled message displayed in the output indicates that PPK-based quantum-safe encryption is enabled.
The following is a sample output from the showcryptoikev2sadetailed command:
IPv4 Crypto IKEv2 SA
Tunnel-id Local Remote fvrf/ivrf Status
3 <src IP>/SrcPort <Dst IP>/DstPort none/none READY
Encr: AES-CBC, keysize: 256, PRF: SHA512, Hash: SHA512, DH Grp:19,
Auth sign:
.
.
.
Initiator of SA : No
Quantum Resistance Enabled
Additional References for Quantum-Safe Encryption Using Postquantum Preshared Keys
Mixing Preshared Keys in the Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2) for Postquantum Security
Technical Assistance
Description
Link
The Cisco Support and Documentation website provides online resources to download documentation, software, and tools. Use
these resources to install and configure the software and to troubleshoot and resolve technical issues with Cisco products
and technologies. Access to most tools on the Cisco Support and Documentation website requires a Cisco.com user ID and password.
Feature Information for Quantum-Safe Encryption Using Postquantum Preshared Keys
The following table provides release information about the feature or features described in this module. This table lists
only the software release that introduced support for a given feature in a given software release train. Unless noted otherwise,
subsequent releases of that software release train also support that feature.
Use Cisco Feature Navigator to find information about platform support and Cisco software image support. To access Cisco
Feature Navigator, go to www.cisco.com/go/cfn. An account on Cisco.com is not required.
Table 1. Feature Information for Quantum-Safe Encryption Using Postquantum Preshared Keys
Feature Name
Releases
Feature Information
Quantum-Safe Encryption Using Postquantum Preshared Keys
Cisco IOS XE Release 17.11.1a
The feature implements RFC 8784 and Cisco Secure Key Integration Protocol (SKIP) for quantum-safe encryption of IKEv2 and
IPsec packets using Postquantum Preshared Keys (PPKs). The PPKs that are configured manually are known as manual PPKs, and
the PPKs that are imported from an external key source using the SKIP protocol are known as dynamic PPKs.
Quantum-Safe Encryption Using Postquantum Preshared Keys
Cisco IOS XE Release 17.12.1a
This enhancement introduces support for Quantum-Safe Encryption Using Postquantum Preshared Keys for the following platforms: