Without this feature, there are inconsistencies regarding which TEK and KEK policy changes will trigger rekeys:
-
Multiple rekeys could be sent during the course of security policy updates.
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Some policy changes (for example, transform set, profile, lifetime, and anti-replay) will install new SAs on GMs; however,
the SAs from the existing policies remain active until their lifetimes expire.
-
Some policy changes (for example, a TEK’s access control entry/access control list (ACE/ACL) changes) will install new SAs
on GMs and take effect immediately. However, the obsolete SAs are kept in each GM’s database (and can be displayed using the
show crypto ipsec sa command until their lifetimes expire).
For example, if the KS changes the policy from Data Encryption Standard (DES) to Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), when
the GM receives this triggered rekey, it installs the new SAs (for example, for AES) and shortens the lifetimes of the old
SAs (for example, for DES). The GM continues to encrypt and decrypt traffic using the old SAs until their shortened lifetimes
expire.
Following is the formula to calculate the shortened lifetime:
TEK_SLT = MIN(TEK_RLT, MAX(90s, MIN(5%(TEK_CLT), 3600s)))
where
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TEK_SLT is the TEK shortened lifetime
-
TEK_RLT is the TEK remaining lifetime
-
TEK_CLT is the TEK configured lifetime
The following table summarizes the inconsistencies regarding rekeys.
Table 1. Rekey Behavior After Security Policy Changes
Policy Changes
|
Rekey Sent?
|
Rekey Behavior After Policy Changes
|
TEK: SA lifetime
|
No
|
The old SA remains active until its lifetime expires. The new lifetime will be effective after the next scheduled rekey.
Even if you enter the
clear crypto sa
command, it will re-register and download the old SA with the old lifetime again.
|
TEK: IPSEC transform set
|
Yes
|
The SA of the old transform set remains active until its lifetime expires.
|
TEK: IPSEC profile
|
Yes
|
The SA of the old profile remains active until its lifetime expires.
|
TEK: Matching ACL
|
Yes
|
Outbound packet classification immediately uses the ACL. But the old SAs remain in the SA database (you can view them by
using the
show crypto ipsec sa command).
|
TEK: Enable replay counter
|
Yes
|
But the old SA without counter replay remains active until its lifetime expires.
|
TEK: Change replay counter value
|
No
|
The SA with a new replay counter is sent out in the next scheduled rekey.
|
TEK: Disable replay counter
|
Yes
|
But the old SA with counter replay enabled remains active until its lifetime expires.
|
TEK: Enable TBAR
|
Yes
|
But the old SA with time-based anti-replay (TBAR) disabled remains active until its lifetime expires.
|
TEK: Change TBAR window
|
No
|
The SA with a new TBAR window will be sent out in the next scheduled rekey.
|
TEK: Disable TBAR
|
Yes
|
But the old SA with TBAR enabled remains active until its lifetime expires.
|
TEK: Enable receive-only
|
Yes
|
Receive-only mode is activated right after the rekey.
|
TEK: Disable receive-only
|
Yes
|
Receive-only mode is deactivated right after the rekey.
|
KEK: SA lifetime behavior
|
No
|
The change is applied with the next rekey.
|
KEK: Change authentication key
|
Yes
|
The change is applied immediately.
|
KEK: Change crypto algorithm
|
Yes
|
The change is applied immediately.
|
This feature solves these problems by ensuring consistency. With this feature, GET VPN policy changes alone will no longer
trigger a rekey. When you change the policy (and exit from global configuration mode), a syslog message appears on the primary
KS indicating that the policy has changed and a rekey is needed. This feature provides a new command that you then enter on
the KS (or primary KS) to send a rekey (that is based on the latest security policy in the running configuration).
This feature also provides an extra keyword to the new command to force a GM receiving the rekey to remove the old TEKs and
KEK immediately and install the new TEKs and KEK. Therefore, the new policy takes effect immediately without waiting for old
policy SAs to expire. (However, using this keyword could cause a temporary traffic discontinuity, because all GMs might not
receive the rekey message at the same time.)