# **Understand EAP-FAST and Chaining Implementations on AnyConnect NAM and ISE**

# Contents

Introduction
Prerequisites
Requirements
Components Used
Theory
Phases
PAC
When PACs are generated
EAP-FAST Server Master Key ACS 4.x vs ACS 5x and ISE
Session Resume
Server State
Stateless (PAC based)
AnyConnect NAM implementation
PAC provisioning (phase 0)
Anonymous TLS tunnel
Authenticated TLS tunnel
EAP-Chaining
Where PAC files are stored
AnyConnect NAM 3.1 vs 4.0
Examples
Network Diagram
EAP-Fast without EAP chaining with user and machine PAC
EAP-Fast with EAP chaining with PAC Fast Reconnect
EAP-Fast with EAP chaining without PAC
EAP-Fast with EAP chaining authorization PAC expiration
EAP-Fast with EAP chaining tunnel PAC expired
EAP-Fast with EAP chaining and anonymous TLS tunnel PAC provisioning
EAP-Fast with EAP chaining user authentication only
EAP-Fast with EAP chaining and inconsistent anonymous TLS tunnel settings
Troubleshoot
ISE
AnyConnect NAM
References

# Introduction

This document describes details regarding EAP-FAST implementation on Cisco AnyConnect Network Access Manager (NAM) and Identity Services Engine (ISE).

# Prerequisites

# Requirements

Cisco recommends that you have knowledge of these topics:

- Basic knowledge of EAP framework and EAP-FAST methods
- Basic knowledge of Identity Services Engine (ISE)
- Basic knowledge of AnyConnect NAM and Profile Editor
- Basic knowledge of Cisco Catalyst configuration for 802.1x services

# **Components Used**

The information in this document is based on these software versions:

- Windows 7 with Cisco AnyConnect Secure Mobility Client, Release 3.1 and 4.0
- Cisco Catalyst 3750X switch with software 15.2.1 and later
- Cisco ISE, Release 1.4

The information in this document was created from the devices in a specific lab environment. All of the devices used in this document started with a cleared (default) configuration. If your network is live, ensure that you understand the potential impact of any command.

# Theory

## Phases

EAP-FAST is a flexible EAP method which allows mutual authentication of a supplicant and a server. It is similar to EAP-PEAP, but typically does not require the use of client or even server certificates. One advantage of EAP-FAST is the ability to chain multiple authentications (using multiple inner methods) and bind it cryptographically together (EAP Chaining). Cisco implementations use this for user and machine authentications.

EAP-FAST utilizes Protected Access Credentials (PAC) in order to quickly establish the TLS tunnel (session resume) or to authorize the user/machine (skip inner method for authentication).

There are 3 phases for EAP-FAST:

- phase 0 (PAC provisioning)
- phase 1 (TLS tunnel establishment)
- phase 2 (Authentication)

EAP-FAST supports PAC-less and PAC-based conversation. PAC-based consists of PAC provisioning and PAC-based authentication. PAC provisioning can be based on anonymous or authenticated TLS session.

# PAC

PAC is Protected Access Credentials generated by the server and provided to client. It consists of:

- PAC key (random secret value, used to derive TLS master and session keys)
- PAC opaque (PAC key + user identity all encrypted by EAP-FAST server master key)
- PAC info (server identity, TTL timers)

The server issuing the PAC encrypts the PAC key and identity using the EAP-FAST server master key (that is PAC opaque) and sends the whole PAC to the client. It does not keep/store any other information (except master key which is the same for all PACs).

Once the PAC opaque is received, it is decrypted using the EAP-FAST server master key and validated. The PAC key is used to derive the TLS master and session keys for an abbreviated TLS tunnel.

New EAP-FAST server master keys are generated when the previous master key expires. In some cases, a master key can be revoked.

There are a few types of PACs being used currently:

- Tunnel PAC: used for TLS tunnel establishment (without the need of client or server certificate). Sent in TLS Client Hello
- Machine PAC: used for TLS tunnel establishment and immediate machine authorization. Sent in TLS Client Hello
- User Authorization PAC: used for immediate user authentication (skip inner method) if allowed by server. Sent inside TLS tunnel using TLV.
- Machine Authorization PAC: used for immediate machine authentication (skip inner method) if allowed by server. Sent inside TLS tunnel using TLV.
- Trustsec PAC: used for authorization when performing environmental or policy refresh.

All of those PACs are usually delivered automatically in phase 0. Some of the PACs (Tunnel, Machine, Trustsec) can be also delivered manually.

### When PACs are generated

- Tunnel PAC: provisioned after a successful authentication (inner method) if not used previously.
- Authorization PAC: provisioned after successful authentication (inner method) if not used previously.
- Machine PAC: provisioned after successful machine authentication (inner method) if not used previously and when an Authorization PAC is not used. It is provisioned when the Tunnel PAC expires; however, not when the Authorization PAC expires. It is provisioned when EAP-Chaining is enabled or disabled.

### Note:

Each PAC provisioning requires successful authentication except in the use case: authorized user asks for the Machine PAC for a machine that does not have an AD account.

This table summarizes provisioning and proactive update functionality:

РАС Туре	Tunnel v1/v1a/CTS	Machine	Authorization
Provide PAC on request on provisioning	IVES	only on authenticated provisioning	only on authenticated provisioning and if Tunnel PAC is requested also
Provide PAC on request on authentication	yes		only if it was not used in this authentication

Proactive update	yes	no	no
	reject and do not provide		reject and do not provide the new one
Support ACS 4.x PACs	for Tunnel PAC v1/v1a	yes	no

### EAP-FAST Server Master Key ACS 4.x vs ACS 5x and ISE

There is a slight difference in Master key handling when comparing ACS 4.x and ISE

Feature	ACS 4.1.2	ACS 5.x / ISE
Master Key	Master key has TTL, can be active, retired or expired	Master key is automatically generated from seed at every configured period of time. Specific Master Key is always accessible and then never expired
PAC Refresh	PAC update is sent by server when PAC is expired, unless Master Key used for PAC encryption is expired	PAC update is sent by server after first successful authentication that is performed in specific configurable period of time before PAC expiration moment.

In other words, ISE keeps all old master keys and generate a new one by default once per week. As the Master Key cannot expire, only the PAC TTL is validated.

The ISE Master Key generation period is configured from *Administration -> Settings -> Protocol -> EAP-FAST -> EAP-FAST Settings*.

## **Session Resume**

This is an important component allowing for Tunnel PAC usage. It allows for TLS tunnel renegotiation without usage of certificates.

There are two session resume types for EAP-FAST: Server state based and stateless (PAC based).

#### **Server State**

Standard TLS based method is based on the TLS SessionID cached on the server. The client sending the TLS Client Hello attaches the SessionID in order to resume the session. The session is only used for PAC provisioning when using an anonymous TLS tunnel:

<pre>10.62.148.109 10.48.17.14 RADIUS 378 Access-Request(1) (id=9, 1= anonymous 10.48.17.14 10.62.148.109 RADIUS 86 Access-Reject(3) (id=9, 1=4 10.62.148.109 10.48.17.14 RADIUS 301 Access-Request(1) (id=30, 1 anonymous 10.48.17.14 10.62.148.109 RADIUS 193 Access-Challenge(11) (id=30 10.62.148.109 10.48.17.14 RADIUS 510 Access-Request(1) (id=31, 1 anonymous 10.62.148.109 10.48.17.14 RADIUS 510 Access-Request(1) (id=31, 1 anonymous 10.62.148.109 10.48.17.14 RADIUS 510 Access-Request(1) (id=31, 1 anonymous Length: 138 Type: Flexible Authentication via Secure Tunneling EAP (EAP-FAST) (43) ▷ EAP-TLS Flags: 0x01 ♡ Secure Sockets Layer ♡ TLSv1 Record Layer: Handshake Protocol: Client Hello Content Type: Handshake (22) Version: TLS 1.0 (0x0301) Length: 127 ♡ Handshake Protocol: Client Hello Handshake Type: Client Hello (1) Length: 123 Version: TLS 1.0 (0x0301) ▷ Random Session ID Length: 32 Session ID Length: 52</pre>	Source	Destination	Protocol	Lengtł	Info	User-Name			
<pre>10.62.148.109 10.48.17.14 RADIUS 301 Access-Request(1) (id=30, l anonymous 10.48.17.14 10.62.148.109 RADIUS 193 Access-Challenge(11) (id=30 10.62.148.109 10.48.17.14 RADIUS 510 Access-Request(1) (id=31, l anonymous Length: 138 Type: Flexible Authentication via Secure Tunneling EAP (EAP-FAST) (43) &gt; EAP-TLS Flags: 0x01 Secure Sockets Layer</pre>	10.62.148.109	10.48.17.14	RADIUS	378	Access-Request(1) (id=9, l=	= anonymous			
<pre>10.48.17.14 10.62.148.109 RADIUS 193 Access-Challenge(11) (id=30 10.62.148.109 10.48.17.14 RADIUS 510 Access-Request(1) (id=31, l anonymous Length: 138 Type: Flexible Authentication via Secure Tunneling EAP (EAP-FAST) (43) ▷ EAP-TLS Flags: 0x01 ▽ Secure Sockets Layer ▽ TLSv1 Record Layer: Handshake Protocol: Client Hello Content Type: Handshake (22) Version: TLS 1.0 (0x0301) Length: 127 ▽ Handshake Protocol: Client Hello Handshake Type: Client Hello (1) Length: 123 Version: TLS 1.0 (0x0301) ▷ Random Session ID Length: 32 Session ID Length: 52</pre>	10.48.17.14	10.62.148.109	RADIUS	86	Access-Reject(3) (id=9, l=4	1			
<pre>10.62.148.109 10.48.17.14 RADIUS 510 Access-Request(1) (id=31, l anonymous Length: 138 Type: Flexible Authentication via Secure Tunneling EAP (EAP-FAST) (43) EAP-TLS Flags: 0x01 Secure Sockets Layer TLSv1 Record Layer: Handshake Protocol: Client Hello Content Type: Handshake (22) Version: TLS 1.0 (0x0301) Length: 127 Handshake Protocol: Client Hello Handshake Type: Client Hello (1) Length: 123 Version: TLS 1.0 (0x0301) Random Session ID Length: 32 Session ID: 9a344ae351082ec6dbafb8509cf99b4fa664574b6272f876 Cipher Suites Length: 52</pre>	10.62.148.109	10.48.17.14	RADIUS	301	Access-Request(1) (id=30, 1	. anonymous			
Length: 138 Type: Flexible Authentication via Secure Tunneling EAP (EAP-FAST) (43) ▷ EAP-TLS Flags: 0x01 ♡ Secure Sockets Layer ♡ TLSv1 Record Layer: Handshake Protocol: Client Hello Content Type: Handshake (22) Version: TLS 1.0 (0x0301) Length: 127 ♡ Handshake Protocol: Client Hello Handshake Type: Client Hello (1) Length: 123 Version: TLS 1.0 (0x0301) ▷ Random Session ID Length: 32 Session ID: 9a344ae351082ec6dbafb8509cf99b4fa664574b6272f876 Cipher Suites Length: 52	10.48.17.14	10.62.148.109	RADIUS	193	Access-Challenge(11) (id=30	)			
Type: Flexible Authentication via Secure Tunneling EAP (EAP-FAST) (43) EAP-TLS Flags: 0x01 Secure Sockets Layer TLSv1 Record Layer: Handshake Protocol: Client Hello Content Type: Handshake (22) Version: TLS 1.0 (0x0301) Length: 127 Handshake Protocol: Client Hello Handshake Type: Client Hello (1) Length: 123 Version: TLS 1.0 (0x0301) Random Session ID Length: 32 Session ID Length: 32 Session ID: 9a344ae351082ec6dbafb8509cf99b4fa664574b6272f876 Cipher Suites Length: 52	10.62.148.109	10.48.17.14	RADIUS	510	Access-Request(1) (id=31, 1	. anonymous			
<ul> <li>EAP-TLS Flags: 0x01</li> <li>Secure Sockets Layer</li> <li>TLSv1 Record Layer: Handshake Protocol: Client Hello         Content Type: Handshake (22)         Version: TLS 1.0 (0x0301)         Length: 127</li> <li>Handshake Protocol: Client Hello         Handshake Type: Client Hello (1)         Length: 123         Version: TLS 1.0 (0x0301)         Random         Session ID Length: 32         Session ID Length: 32         Session ID: 9a344ae351082ec6dbafb8509cf99b4fa664574b6272f876         Cipher Suites Length: 52</li> </ul>	Length: 138								
<pre>Secure Sockets Layer     Secure Sockets Layer: Handshake Protocol: Client Hello     Content Type: Handshake (22)     Version: TLS 1.0 (0x0301)     Length: 127     Handshake Protocol: Client Hello     Handshake Type: Client Hello (1)     Length: 123     Version: TLS 1.0 (0x0301)     Random     Session ID Length: 32     Session ID: 9a344ae351082ec6dbafb8509cf99b4fa664574b6272f876     Cipher Suites Length: 52</pre>	Type: Flexibl	e Authenticatio	on via Sec	ure Tun	neling EAP (EAP-FAST) (43)				
TLSv1 Record Layer: Handshake Protocol: Client Hello Content Type: Handshake (22) Version: TLS 1.0 (0x0301) Length: 127 Handshake Protocol: Client Hello Handshake Type: Client Hello (1) Length: 123 Version: TLS 1.0 (0x0301) Random Session ID Length: 32 Session ID Length: 32 Session ID: 9a344ae351082ec6dbafb8509cf99b4fa664574b6272f876									
Content Type: Handshake (22) Version: TLS 1.0 (0x0301) Length: 127 Handshake Protocol: Client Hello Handshake Type: Client Hello (1) Length: 123 Version: TLS 1.0 (0x0301) Random Session ID Length: 32 Session ID: 9a344ae351082ec6dbafb8509cf99b4fa664574b6272f876 Cipher Suites Length: 52	⊽Secure Socket	s Layer							
<pre>Version: TLS 1.0 (0x0301) Length: 127 VHandshake Protocol: Client Hello Handshake Type: Client Hello (1) Length: 123 Version: TLS 1.0 (0x0301) Random Session ID Length: 32 Session ID: 9a344ae351082ec6dbafb8509cf99b4fa664574b6272f876 Cipher Suites Length: 52</pre>		$ar{\sim}$ TLSv1 Record Layer: Handshake Protocol: Client Hello							
<pre>Length: 127 </pre> Handshake Protocol: Client Hello Handshake Type: Client Hello (1) Length: 123 Version: TLS 1.0 (0x0301)  Random Session ID Length: 32  Session ID: 9a344ae351082ec6dbafb8509cf99b4fa664574b6272f876 Cipher Suites Length: 52		•							
<pre>&gt; Handshake Protocol: Client Hello Handshake Type: Client Hello (1) Length: 123 Version: TLS 1.0 (0x0301) &gt; Random Session ID Length: 32 Session ID: 9a344ae351082ec6dbafb8509cf99b4fa664574b6272f876 Cipher Suites Length: 52</pre>			)						
Handshake Type: Client Hello (1) Length: 123 Version: TLS 1.0 (0x0301) > Random Session ID Length: 32 Session ID: 9a344ae351082ec6dbafb8509cf99b4fa664574b6272f876 Cipher Suites Length: 52	-								
Length: 123 Version: TLS 1.0 (0x0301) D Random Session ID Length: 32 Session ID: 9a344ae351082ec6dbafb8509cf99b4fa664574b6272f876 Cipher Suites Length: 52									
Version: TLS 1.0 (0x0301) > Random Session ID Length: 32 Session ID: 9a344ae351082ec6dbafb8509cf99b4fa664574b6272f876 Cipher Suites Length: 52			Hello (1)						
Random Session ID Length: 32 Session ID: 9a344ae351082ec6dbafb8509cf99b4fa664574b6272f876 Cipher Suites Length: 52	0								
Session ID Length: 32 Session ID: 9a344ae351082ec6dbafb8509cf99b4fa664574b6272f876 Cipher Suites Length: 52		ILS I.0 (0x030	91)						
Session ID: 9a344ae351082ec6dbafb8509cf99b4fa664574b6272f876 Cipher Suites Length: 52									
Cipher Suites Length: 52									
N Ciphan Suitas (26 suitas)									
Cipher Suites (26 suites)									
Compression Methods Length: 1 > Compression Methods (1 method)			-						

### Stateless (PAC based)

User/Machine Authorization PAC is used to store the previous authentication and authorization states for the peer.

Client side resume is based on RFC 4507. The server does not need to cache any data; instead the client attaches the PAC in the TLS Client Hello SessionTicket extension. In turn, the PAC is validated by the server. Example based on Tunnel PAC delivered to the server:

Source	Destination	Protocol	Lengtł	Info	User-Name	
23 10.62.148.109	10.48.17.14	RADIUS	301	Access-Request(1) (id=91, l=259)	anonymous	
24 10.48.17.14	10.62.148.109	RADIUS	193	Access-Challenge(11) (id=91, l=151)		
25 10.62.148.109	10.48.17.14	RADIUS	666	Access-Request(1) (id=92, l=624)	anonymous	
26 10.48.17.14	10.62.148.109	RADIUS	311	Access-Challenge(11) (id=92, l=269)		
27 10.62.148.109	10.48.17.14	RADIUS	437	Access-Request(1) (id=93, l=395)	anonymous	
28 10.48.17.14	10.62.148.109	RADIUS	226	Access-Challenge(11) (id=93, l=184)		
29 10.62.148.109	10.48.17.14	RADIUS	468	Access-Request(1) (id=94, l=426)	anonymous	
30 10.48.17.14	10.62.148.109	RADIUS	258	Access-Challenge(11) (id=94, l=216)		
31 10.62.148.109	10.48.17.14	RADIUS	516	Access-Request(1) (id=95, l=474)	anonymous	
32 10.48.17.14	10.62.148.109	RADIUS	258	Access-Challenge(11) (id=95, l=216)		
33 10.62.148.109	10.48.17.14	RADIUS	452	Access-Request(1) (id=96, l=410)	anonymous	
Content Type: Handshake (22) Version: TLS 1.0 (0x0301) Length: 281 ✓ Handshake Protocol: Client Hello Handshake Type: Client Hello (1) Length: 277 Version: TLS 1.0 (0x0301) ▷ Random Session ID Length: 0 Cipher Suites Length: 52 ▷ Cipher Suites (26 suites) Compression Methods Length: 1 ▷ Compression Methods Length: 1 ▷ Compression Methods (1 method) Extensions Length: 184 ✓ Extension: SessionTicket TLS <u>Type: SessionTicket TLS (0x0023)</u> Length: 180 Data (180 bytes)						

# AnyConnect NAM implementation

It is enabled on client side (AnyConnect NAM) via Fast Reconnect - but it is used to control only authorization PAC usage.

AnyConnect Profile Editor - Network Access Manager File Help	
Network Access Manager Client Policy Authentication Policy Profile:ility Client\Network Access Manager\system\configuration.xml	
EAP Hethods     EAP MSCHAPV2   EAP-TLS EAP-TLS EAP-TTLS EAP-GTC PEAP © EAP-FAST      EAP-FAST Settings   Validate Server Identity Image Eaple Fast Reconnect Inner Methods based on Credentials Source Ø Authenticate using a Password Ø EAP-GTC Ø If using PACs, allow unauthenticated PAC provisioning Ø Authenticate using a Certificate Ø When requested send the clent certificate in the dear Ø Only send dient certificates inside the tunnel Ø Send dient certificate using EAP-TLS in the tunnel Ø Use PACS	Media Type         Security Level         Connection Type         Machine Auth         Certificates         PAC Files         Credentials         User Auth         Certificates         PAC Files         Credentials

With the setting disabled, NAM still uses the tunnel PAC to build the TLS tunnel (no certificates needed). However, this does not use authorization PACs in order to perform immediate user and machine authorization. As a result, phase 2 with the inner method is always required.

ISE has an option to enable Stateless Session Resume. And as on NAM it is just for Authorization PAC. Tunnel PAC usage is controlled with options "Use PACs".

🚽 🗹 Allow EAP-FAST

EAP-FAST Inner Methods           Image: Mathematical Action           Image: Mathematical Action      <			
Allow Password Change Retries 3 (Valid Range 0 t	o 3)		
Allow EAP-GTC			
Allow Password Change Retries 3 (Valid Range 0 t	o 3)		
Allow EAP-TLS			
Allow Authentication of expired certificates to allow certifica	ïcate renewal in A	uthorization Poli	icy
💽 Use PACs 🛛 🔘 Don't Use PACs			
Tunnel PAC Time To Live	90	Days 🍷	]
Proactive PAC update will occur after 10 % of PAC Tir	ne To Live has exp	pired	
Allow Anonymous In-Band PAC Provisioning			
Allow Authenticated In-Band PAC Provisioning			
Server Returns Access Accept After Authenticate	d Provisioning		
Accept Client Certificate For Provisioning			
Allow Machine Authentication			
Machine PAC Time To Live	1	Weeks 🍷	]
Enable Stateless Session Resume			
Authorization PAC Time To Live	1	Hours 🍷	i
Enable EAP Chaining			
Preferred EAP Protocol EAP-FAST			

NAM tries to use PACs if the option is enabled. If "Don't Use PACs" is configured in ISE and ISE receives a Tunnel PAC in the TLS extension the "insert here" error is reported and an EAP Failure is returned:

insert here

In ISE, it is also necessary to enable session resume based on TLS SessionID (from Global EAP-FAST settings). it is disabled by default:

EAP FAST Settings	
* Authority Identity Info Description * Master Key Generation Period Revoke all master keys and PACs	1 Weeks
PAC-less Session Resume	Enable PAC-less Session Resume
Save	* PAC-less Session Timeout 7,200

Please keep in mind that only one type of session resume can be used. SessionID based is used only for PAC-less deployments, RFC 4507 based is used only for PAC deployments.

# PAC provisioning (phase 0)

PACs can be automatically provisioned in phase0. Phase 0 consists of:

- TLS tunnel establishment
- Authentication (inner method)

PACs are delivered after a successful authentication inside the TLS tunnel via PAC TLV (and PAC TLV Acknowledgement)

### **Anonymous TLS tunnel**

For deployments without a PKI infrastructure, it is possible to use an anonymous TLS tunnel. The anonymous TLS tunnel is built using the Diffie Hellman cipher suite - without the need of a server or client certificate. This approach is prone to Man in the Middle attacks (impersonation).

To use this option, NAM requires this configured option:

"If using PACs allow for unauthenticated PAC provisioning" (that makes sense only for password-based inner method because without PKI infrastructure it is not possible to use certificate-based inner method).

Also, ISE needs "Allow Anonymous In-band PAC Provisioning" configuration under the Authentication Allowed Protocols.

Anonymous in-band PAC provisioning is being used in TrustSec NDAC deployments (EAP-FAST session negotiated between network devices).

### **Authenticated TLS tunnel**

This is the most secure and recommended option. The TLS tunnel is built based on the server certificate which is validated by the supplicant. This requires a PKI infrastructure on the server side only, which is required for ISE (on NAM it is possible to disable option "Validate Server Identity".

For ISE there are two additional options:

- Allow Anonymous In-Band PAC Provisioning
- Allow Authenticated In-Band PAC Provisioning
  - Server Returns Access Accept After Authenticated Provisioning
  - Accept Client Certificate For Provisioning

Normally, after PAC provisioning, an Access-Reject is sent forcing the supplicant to reauthenticate using PACs. But because PACs were delivered in the TLS tunnel with authentication, it is possible to shorten the whole process and return Access-Accept immediately after PAC provisioning.

The second option builds the TLS tunnel based on client certificate (this requires PKI deployment on the endpoints). This allows the TLS tunnel to be built with mutual authentication, which skips the inner method and goes directly to the PAC provisioning phase. it is important to be careful here - sometimes the supplicant presents a certificate which is not trusted by ISE (intended for other purposes) and the session

fails.

# **EAP-Chaining**


Allows user and machine authentication within one Radius/EAP session. Multiple EAP methods can be chained together. After the first authentication (typically machine) has finished successfully, the server sends an Intermediate-Result TLV (inside TLS tunnel) indicating success. That TLV must be accompanied by a Crypto-Binding TLV Request. Cryptobinding is used to prove that both the server and peer have participated in the specific sequence of authentications. The Cryptobinding process uses the keying material from phase 1 and phase 2. Additionally, one more TLV is attached: EAP-Payload - this is initiating the new session (typically for the user). Once the radius server (ISE) receives the Crypto-Binding TLV Response and validates it, this displays in the log and the next EAP method is tried (typically for user authentication):

<#root>

12126

EAP-FAST cryptobinding verification passed

If cryptobinding validation fails, the whole EAP session fails. If one of the authentications within failed then it is still fine - as a result, ISE allows an administrator to configure multiple chaining results based on Authorization Condition NetworkAccess:EapChainingResult:



EAP-Chaining is enabled on NAM automatically when EAP-FAST user and machine authentication is enabled.

EAP-Chaining must be configured in ISE.

## Where PAC files are stored

By default, Tunnel and Machine PACs are stored in C:\ProgramData\Cisco\Cisco AnyConnect Secure Mobility Client\Network Access Manager\system\internalConfiguration.xml in sections <credential>. Those are stored in encrypted form.

▼C:\*.*				* •	✓ \Network Access Man	ager\sys	tem\*.*		* 🔻
↑ Name	Ext	Size	Date	Attr	↑ Name	Ext	Size	Date	Attr
(1) [\$Recycle.Bin]		<dir></dir>	07/02/2015 15:	14-hs	<b>\$</b> [.]		<dir></dir>	06/30/2015	17:31—
in in in its in the second sec		<dir></dir>	10/16/2014 16:	40—	configuration	xml	9,853	06/30/2015	
[Documents and Settings]		<lnk></lnk>	07/14/2009 07:	08-hs	internalConfiguration	xml	4,108	07/03/2015	10:31-a
Lister - [c:\ProgramData\Ci	sco\Ci	isco AnyCo	onnect Secure Mol	bility Clien	t\Network Access Manager\s	ystem∖in	ternalConf	iguratio 🗖 🗖	
File Edit Options Encodi	ng F	Help							54 %
xml version="1.0"</td <td>enco</td> <th>ding="</th> <td>UTF-8''?&gt;</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td>	enco	ding="	UTF-8''?>						
<internalconfigurati< td=""><td>onDa</td><th>ata&gt;</th><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></internalconfigurati<>	onDa	ata>							
<group></group>									
<proupname>Local net</proupname>	work	ks <td>upName&gt;</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td>	upName>						
<network></network>									
<pre><networkname>eap-fas</networkname></pre>	st-pa	ac <td>workName&gt;</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td>	workName>						
<pre><credentials></credentials></pre>	100-	044604	45444007-00	.0	7	074645	h b a C d b O		
<pre><credential>01000000</credential></pre>									
479941b9d8204000000 fb11b1a5cd7726dc3c35									
0000028e48323bf8a33f									
f29ae6b5a05071218b6b									
28b721871dea59eed7ce									
ed7d828706f8926e951e									
26af48d27eb1831a79c3									
dd1acb86246d0515b598	68et	010205d	7438f58d7bb7f	F3a2c6d	2cff972acd1d39986de	3472a1	6b0e288		
40710e85536583a6a376	i99e7	/2aac27	d9aed327d <i>0</i> 38 <sup>j</sup>	499390d	da4f1557a4c9176eea0	aóe8có	03868ba		
b0cb2969fee9d5e7fd5f	7c22	2319bbf	06f84a293cae	1c 0f 172	6ca743be979eef10977	e7ee1b	855949a		
3286a7b80214c8792583	1f59	82bbc5	ef8f9575e8f6 <sup>j</sup>	43cca49	efca9fbb72bd954dd9a	b062e2	30b84c9		
3f9defdb8f2c5663cae4	4000	30000a O	1a4e80c49f1e7	7247751	cc9d8254bb12e1024db	9392c1	fc4213b		
0510617864dfcac2e <u>518</u>	la212	2 0e 0e 4d	04d7892d2dcc9	7f3be50	866ece862a9a18542ec	8cf75c	F0113d7		
1a04									
<pre><credential>0100000</credential></pre>									
479941b9d8204000000									
354db14525fd19908da3									
000002b8a5e959adad88									
00055adf6ed947748fa5									
826084b3535fc0a7ff23									
965d34750e1eacef04b2									
6a2febf10297bddafe30 95ad6df14e7830ddbde5					A		c60ad4d b837351		
					10000				

Authorization PACs are stored only in memory and are removed after reboot or NAM service restart.

A service restart is required to remove the Tunnel or Machine PAC.

# AnyConnect NAM 3.1 vs 4.0

AnyConnect 3.x NAM profile editor allowed the administrator to configure PACs manually. This feature has been removed from AnyConnect 4.x NAM profile editor.


🚰 AnyConnect Profile Editor - I	Network Access Manager	
File Help		
Network Access Manager	Networks Profile: C:\Users\cisco\Documents\configuration.xml	
	PAC files	Media Type
🛒 Network Groups	PACINGS	Security Level
		Connection Type
		Machine Auth
		Certificates
		PAC Files
		Credentials
		User Auth
	Add Password protected Remove	Certificates
		PAC Files
		Credentials

The decision to remove that functionality is based on Cisco bug ID  $\underline{CSCuf31422}$  and Cisco bug ID  $\underline{CSCua13140}$ .

# Examples

# **Network Diagram**

All the examples were tested using this network topology. The same applies also when using wireless.



AnyConnect 3.1

# EAP-Fast without EAP chaining with user and machine PAC

By default, EAP\_chaining is disabled on ISE. However, all other options are enabled including Machine and Authorization PACs. The supplicant already has a valid Machine and Tunnel PAC. In this flow, there are two separate authentications - one for the machine and one for the user - with separate logs on ISE. The main steps as logged by ISE. First authentication (machine):

- Supplicant sends TLS Client Hello with Machine PAC.
- Server validates the Machine PAC and builds the TLS tunnel (no certificates used).
- Server validates the Machine PAC and performs the account lookup in Active Directory and skips the inner method.

<#root>

12102 Extracted EAP-Response containing EAP-FAST challenge-response and accepting EAP-FAST as negotiate

12800 Extracted first TLS record; TLS handshake started

12174 Received Machine PAC

12805 Extracted TLS ClientHello message 12806 Prepared TLS ServerHello message 12801 Prepared TLS ChangeCipherSpec message

12816 TLS handshake succeeded

12132 EAP-FAST built PAC-based tunnel for purpose of authentication

24351 Account validation succeeded

24420 User's Attributes retrieval from Active Directory succeeded - example . com

22037 Authentication Passed

12124 EAP-FAST inner method skipped

11503 Prepared EAP-Success 11002 Returned RADIUS Access-Accept

The second authentication (user):

- Supplicant sends the TLS Client Hello with Tunnel PAC.
- Server validates the PAC and builds the TLS tunnel (no certificates used).
- As supplicant does not have any Authorization PAC, the inner method (EAP-MSCHAP) is used for authentication.

<#root>

12102 Extracted EAP-Response containing EAP-FAST challenge-response and accepting EAP-FAST as negotiate

12800 Extracted first TLS record; TLS handshake started

```
12175 Received Tunnel PAC

12805 Extracted TLS ClientHello message

12806 Prepared TLS ServerHello message

12801 Prepared TLS ChangeCipherSpec message

12816 TLS handshake succeeded

12132 EAP-FAST built PAC-based tunnel for purpose of authentication

12125 EAP-FAST inner method started

11806 Prepared EAP-Request for inner method proposing

EAP-MSCHAP

with challenge

24402 User authentication against Active Directory succeeded - example . com

22037 Authentication Passed

11503 Prepared EAP-Success
```

11002 Returned RADIUS Access-Accept

In the "Other Attributes" section of the detailed report in ISE, this is noted for both user and machine authentications:

<#root>

EapChainingResult:

No chaining

### EAP-Fast with EAP chaining with PAC Fast Reconnect

In this flow, the supplicant already has a valid Tunnel PAC along with the User and Machine Authorization PACs:

- Supplicant sends the TLS Client Hello with Tunnel PAC.
- Server validates the PAC and builds the TLS tunnel (no certificates used).
- ISE starts EAP Chaining, supplicant attaches Authorization PACs for user and Machine using TLV inside the TLS tunnel.
- ISE validates the Authorization PACs (no inner method needed), verifies that accounts exist in Active Directory (no additional authentication), returns success.

#### <#root>

12102 Extracted EAP-Response containing EAP-FAST challenge-response and accepting EAP-FAST as negotia 12800 Extracted first TLS record; TLS handshake started

12175 Received Tunnel PAC

12805 Extracted TLS ClientHello message

- 12806 Prepared TLS ServerHello message
- 12801 Prepared TLS ChangeCipherSpec message
- 12816 TLS handshake succeeded
- 12132 EAP-FAST built PAC-based tunnel for purpose of authentication
- 12209 Starting EAP chaining
- 12210 Received User Authorization PAC
- 12211 Received Machine Authorization PAC
- 24420 User's Attributes retrieval from Active Directory succeeded example .com
- 22037 Authentication Passed
- 24439 Machine Attributes retrieval from Active Directory succeeded example .com
- 22037 Authentication Passed
- 11503 Prepared EAP-Success11002 Returned RADIUS Access-Accept

In the "Other Attributes" section of the detailed report in ISE, this result is noted:

<#root>

EapChainingResult:

EAP Chaining

Additionally, both user and machine credentials are included in the same log as seen here:

Username: cisco,host/mgarcarz-PC

## EAP-Fast with EAP chaining without PAC

In this flow, NAM is configured to not use a PAC, ISE is also configured to not use PAC (but with EAP Chaining)

- Supplicant sends TLS Client Hello without Tunnel PAC.
- Server responds with the TLS Certificate and Certificate Request payloads.
- Supplicant must trust server certificate, does not send any client certificate (certificate payload is zero), TLS tunnel is built.
- ISE send a TLV request for the client certificate inside the TLS tunnel, but supplicant does not (it is not necessary to have it in order to continue).
- Starts EAP Chaining for user, using inner method with MSCHAPv2 authentication.
- Continues with machine authentication, using inner method with MSCHAPv2 authentication.
- No PACs are being provisioned.

#### <#root>

12102 Extracted EAP-Response containing EAP-FAST challenge-response and accepting EAP-FAST as negot 12800

Extracted first TLS record; TLS handshake started

- 12805 Extracted TLS ClientHello message
- 12806 Prepared TLS ServerHello message
- 12807 Prepared TLS Certificate message
- 12809 Prepared TLS CertificateRequest message
- 12811 Extracted TLS Certificate message containing client certificate
- 12812 Extracted TLS ClientKeyExchange message
- 12816 TLS handshake succeeded
- 12207 Client certificate was requested but not received during tunnel establishment. Will renegotiat

12226 Started renegotiated TLS handshake

- 12104 Extracted EAP-Response containing EAP-FAST challenge-response
- 12811 Extracted TLS Certificate message containing client certificate

12812	Extracted	TLS	ClientKeyExchange message
-------	-----------	-----	---------------------------

- 12804 Extracted TLS Finished message
- 12801 Prepared TLS ChangeCipherSpec message
- 12802 Prepared TLS Finished message
- 12226 Started renegotiated TLS handshake
- 12205 Client certificate was requested but not received inside the tunnel. Will continue with inner

12176 EAP-FAST PAC-less full handshake finished successfully

- 12209 Starting EAP chaining
- 12218 Selected identity type 'User'
- 11806 Prepared EAP-Request for inner method proposing EAP-MSCHAP with challenge
- 24402 User authentication against Active Directory succeeded example .com
- 22037 Authentication Passed
- 12219 Selected identity type 'Machine'
- 11806 Prepared EAP-Request for inner method proposing EAP-MSCHAP with challenge
- 24470 Machine authentication against Active Directory is successful example .com
- 22037 Authentication Passed

```
11503 Prepared EAP-Success11002 Returned RADIUS Access-Accept
```

### **EAP-Fast with EAP chaining authorization PAC expiration**

In this flow, the Supplicant has a valid Tunnel PAC but has expired Authorization PACs:

- Supplicant sends the TLS Client Hello with Tunnel PAC.
- Server validates the PAC and builds the TLS tunnel (no certificates used).
- ISE starts EAP Chaining, supplicant attaches Authorization PACs for User and Machine using TLV inside the TLS tunnel.
- As the PACs are expired, the inner method for both user and machine is started (EAP-MSCHAP).
- Once both authentications are successful, both user and machine Authorization PACs are provisioned.

<#root>				
12102	Extracted EAP-Response containing EAP-FAST challenge-response and accepting EAP-FAST as negotia			
12800	Extracted first TLS record; TLS handshake started			
12175	Received Tunnel PAC			
12805	Extracted TLS ClientHello message			
12806 12801	Prepared TLS ServerHello message Prepared TLS ChangeCipherSpec message			
12816	TLS handshake succeeded			
12132	EAP-FAST built PAC-based tunnel for purpose of authentication			
12209	Starting EAP chaining			
12227	User Authorization PAC has expired - will run inner method			
12228	Machine Authorization PAC has expired - will run inner method			
12218	Selected identity type 'User'			
11806	Prepared EAP-Request for inner method proposing EAP-MSCHAP with challenge			
24402	User authentication against Active Directory succeeded - example .com			
22037	Authentication Passed			
12219	Selected identity type 'Machine'			
24470	Machine authentication against Active Directory is successful - example .com			
22037	Authentication Passed			

12179 Successfully finished EAP-FAST machine authorization PAC provisioning/update

```
11503 Prepared EAP-Success11002 Returned RADIUS Access-Accept
```

#### EAP-Fast with EAP chaining tunnel PAC expired

In this flow when no valid tunnel PAC exists, full TLS negotiation with inner phase occurs.

- Supplicant sends the TLS Client Hello without Tunnel PAC.
- Server responds with the TLS Certificate and Certificate Request payloads.
- Supplicant must trust server certificate, does not send client certificate (certificate payload is zero), TLS tunnel built.
- ISE sends TLV request for the client certificate inside the TLS tunnel, but supplicant does not (it is not necessary to have it in order to continue).
- Starts EAP Chaining for user, using inner method with MSCHAPv2 authentication.
- Continues with machine authentication, using inner method with MSCHAPv2 authentication.
- Successfully provisioned all PACs (enabled in ISE config).

#### <#root>

```
    12102 Extracted EAP-Response containing EAP-FAST challenge-response and accepting EAP-FAST as negotia
    12800 Extracted first TLS record; TLS handshake started
    12805 Extracted TLS ClientHello message
    12806 Prepared TLS ServerHello message
```

12807

Prepared TLS Certificate message

12809

Prepared TLS CertificateRequest message

12105 Prepared EAP-Request with another EAP-FAST challenge

- 11006 Returned RADIUS Access-Challenge
- 11001 Received RADIUS Access-Request
- 12816 TLS handshake succeeded

12207

Client certificate was requested but not received during tunnel establishment. Will renegotiate and requ

- 12104 Extracted EAP-Response containing EAP-FAST challenge-response
- 12811 Extracted TLS Certificate message containing client certificate
- 12812 Extracted TLS ClientKeyExchange message
- 12804 Extracted TLS Finished message
- 12801 Prepared TLS ChangeCipherSpec message
- 12802 Prepared TLS Finished message
- 12226 Started renegotiated TLS handshake

12205 Client certificate was requested but not received inside the tunnel. Will continue with inner me

12149 EAP-FAST built authenticated tunnel for purpose of PAC provisioning

- 12105 Prepared EAP-Request with another EAP-FAST challenge
- 11006 Returned RADIUS Access-Challenge
- 11001 Received RADIUS Access-Request
- 11018 RADIUS is re-using an existing session
- 12104 Extracted EAP-Response containing EAP-FAST challenge-response
- 12209 Starting EAP chaining
- 12218 Selected identity type 'User'
- 11806 Prepared EAP-Request for inner method proposing EAP-MSCHAP with challenge
- 24402 User authentication against Active Directory succeeded example .com
- 22037 Authentication Passed
- 12126 EAP-FAST cryptobinding verification passed
- 12200 Approved EAP-FAST client Tunnel PAC request
- 12202 Approved EAP-FAST client Authorization PAC request
- 12219 Selected identity type 'Machine'

11806 Prepared EAP-Request for inner method proposing EAP-MSCHAP with challenge

24470 Machine authentication against Active Directory is successful - example .com

12169	Successfully finished EAP-FAST tunnel PAC provisioning/update
12171	Successfully finished EAP-FAST user authorization PAC provisioning/update
12170	Successfully finished EAP-FAST machine PAC provisioning/update
12179	Successfully finished EAP-FAST machine authorization PAC provisioning/update
11503 11002	Prepared EAP-Success Returned RADIUS Access-Accept

## EAP-Fast with EAP chaining and anonymous TLS tunnel PAC provisioning

In this flow, ISE and NAM anonymous TLS tunnel is configured for PAC provisioning (ISE authenticated TLS tunnel for PAC provisioning is disabled) PAC provisioning request looks like:

- Supplicant sends TLS Client Hello without multiple ciphersuites.
- Server responds with the TLS Server Hello and TLS anonymous Diffie Hellman ciphers (for example TLS\_DH\_anon\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA).
- Supplicant accepts it and the anonymous TLS tunnel is built (no certificates exchanged).
- Starts EAP Chaining for user, using inner method with MSCHAPv2 authentication.
- Continues with machine authentication, using inner method with MSCHAPv2 authentication.
- Because the anonymous TLS tunnel is being built Authorization PACs are not allowed.
- Radius Reject is returned to force supplicant to reauthenticate (using provisioned PAC).

#### <#root>

12102	Extracted EAP-Response containing EAP-FAST challenge-response and accepting EAP-FAST as negot
12800	Extracted first TLS record; TLS handshake started
12805	Extracted TLS ClientHello message
12806	Prepared TLS ServerHello message
12808	Prepared TLS ServerKeyExchange message
12000	Flepared TLS ServerneyEncliange message
12810	Prepared TLS ServerDone message
12812	Extracted TLS ClientKeyExchange message
12804	Extracted TLS Finished message
12001	

12801 Prepared TLS ChangeCipherSpec message

- 12802 Prepared TLS Finished message
- 12816 TLS handshake succeeded
- 12131 EAP-FAST built anonymous tunnel for purpose of PAC provisioning
- 12209 Starting EAP chaining
- 12218 Selected identity type 'User'
- 11806 Prepared EAP-Request for inner method proposing EAP-MSCHAP with challenge
- 24402 User authentication against Active Directory succeeded example .com
- 22037 Authentication Passed
- 12162 Cannot provision Authorization PAC on anonymous provisioning. Authorization PAC can be provisi
- 12200 Approved EAP-FAST client Tunnel PAC request 12219 Selected identity type 'Machine'
- 24470 Machine authentication against Active Directory is successful example .com
- 22037 Authentication Passed
- 12162 Cannot provision Authorization PAC on anonymous provisioning. Authorization PAC can be provision
- 12169 Successfully finished EAP-FAST tunnel PAC provisioning/update
- 12170 Successfully finished EAP-FAST machine PAC provisioning/update
- 11504 Prepared EAP-Failure
- 11003 Returned RADIUS Access-Reject

Wireshark packet captures for anonymous TLS tunnel negotiation:

Source	Destination	Protocol	Lengtł	Info	User-Name		
10.62.148.109	10.48.17.14	RADIUS	301	Access-Request(1) (id=190,	anonymous		
10.48.17.14	10.62.148.109	RADIUS	193	Access-Challenge(11) (id=19	)		
10.62.148.109	10.48.17.14	RADIUS	498	Access-Request(1) (id=191,	anonymous		
10.48.17.14	10.62.148.109	RADIUS	793	Access-Challenge(11) (id=19	)		
10.62.148.109	10.48.17.14	RADIUS		Access-Request(1) (id=192,	-		
10.48.17.14	10.62.148.109	RADIUS		Access-Challenge(11) (id=19			
10.62.148.109	10.48.17.14	RADIUS	378	Access-Request(1) (id=193,	anonymous		
10.48.17.14	10.62.148.109	RADIUS	226	Access-Challenge(11) (id=19	)		
10.62.148.109	10.48.17.14	RADIUS	468	Access-Request(1) (id=194,	anonymous		
10.48.17.14	10.62.148.109	RADIUS	258	Access-Challenge(11) (id=19	)		
Code: Request	(1)						
Id: 161							
Length: 622							
Type: Flexibl	e Authenticatio	on via Sec	ure Tun	neling EAP (EAP-FAST) (43)			
▷ EAP-TLS Flags	: 0×01						
▽Secure Sockets Layer							
arpi TLSv1 Record Layer: Handshake Protocol: Server Hello							
	/pe: Handshake						
Version: TLS 1.0 (0x0301)							
Length: 74							
$\bigtriangledown$ Handshake	Protocol: Serv	er Hello					
Handshake Type: Server Hello (2)							
Length:	Length: 70						
Version:	Version: TLS 1.0 (0x0301)						
▷ Random							
Session ID Length: 32							
Session ID: 41aee5db065f48165c56144aa9dccdc93f67167fbae96393							
Cipher Suite: TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (0x0034)							
Compression Method: null (0)							
$ar{ abla}$ TLSv1 Record Layer: Handshake Protocol: Server Key Exchange							
Contant Type: Handshake (22)							

Content Type: Handshake (22)

## EAP-Fast with EAP chaining user authentication only

In this flow, AnyConnect NAM with EAP-FAST and User (EAP-TLS) and Machine authentication (EAP-TLS) is configured. The Windows PC is booted but user credentials are not provided. Switch initiates 802.1x session, NAM must respond however, user credentials are not provided, (no access to user store and certificate yet) therefore. user authentication fails while the machine is successful - ISE authz condition "Network Access:EapChainingResult EQUALS User failed and machine succeeded" is satisfied. Later, the user logs in and another authentication starts, both user and machine succeeds.

- Supplicant sends TLS Client Hello with Machine PAC.
- Server responds with the TLS Change Cipher Spec TLS tunnel is immediately build based on that PAC.
- ISE initiates EAP Chaining and asking for user identity.
- Supplicant provides the machine identity instead (user not yet ready), finishes EAP-TLS inner method.

- ISE asks for user identity again, supplicant can not provide it.
- ISE sends TLV with intermediate result = failure (for user authentication).
- ISE returns the final EAP success message, ISE condition Network Access:EapChainingResult EQUALS User failed and machine succeeded is satisfied.

<#root>

12102 Extracted EAP-Response containing EAP-FAST challenge-response and accepting EAP-FAST as negotia 12800 Extracted first TLS record; TLS handshake started

12174 Received Machine PAC

- 12805 Extracted TLS ClientHello message
- 12806 Prepared TLS ServerHello message
- 12801 Prepared TLS ChangeCipherSpec message
- 12802 Prepared TLS Finished message
- 12816 TLS handshake succeeded
- 12132 EAP-FAST built PAC-based tunnel for purpose of authentication
- 12209 Starting EAP chaining
- 12218 Selected identity type 'User'
- 12213 Identity type provided by client is not equal to requested type
- 12215 Client suggested 'Machine' identity type instead
- 12104 Extracted EAP-Response containing EAP-FAST challenge-response12523 Extracted EAP-Response/NAK for inner method

requesting to use EAP-TLS instead

12805	Extracted TLS ClientHello message
12806	Prepared TLS ServerHello message
12807	Prepared TLS Certificate message

12809 Prepared TLS CertificateRequest message

12816 TLS handshake succeeded

```
EAP-TLS full handshake finished successfully
12509
22070
        Identity name is taken from certificate attribute
        Selected Identity Source - Test-AD
15013
24323
        Identity resolution detected single matching account
22037
        Authentication Passed
12202
        Approved EAP-FAST client Authorization PAC request
12218
        Selected identity type 'User'
12213
        Identity type provided by client is not equal to requested type
12216
        Identity type provided by client was already used for authentication
        Sent EAP Intermediate Result TLV indicating failure
12967
12179
        Successfully finished EAP-FAST machine authorization PAC provisioning/update
12106
        EAP-FAST authentication phase finished successfully
11503
        Prepared EAP-Success
11002
        Returned RADIUS Access-Accept
```

#### EAP-Fast with EAP chaining and inconsistent anonymous TLS tunnel settings

In this flow, ISE is configured for PAC provisioning only via anonymous TLS tunnel, but NAM is using an authenticated TLS tunnel, this is logged by ISE:

<#root>

12102 Extracted EAP-Response containing EAP-FAST challenge-response and accepting EAP-FAST as negotia 12800 Extracted first TLS record; TLS handshake started

12805 Extracted TLS ClientHello message

12814 Prepared TLS Alert message

12817 TLS handshake failed

12121 Client didn't provide suitable ciphers for anonymous PAC-provisioning

This occurs when NAM is trying to build an authenticated TLS tunnel with its speciphic TLS ciphers - and those are not accepted by ISE which is configured for anonymous TLS tunnel (accepting DH ciphers only)

# Troubleshoot

### ISE

For detailed logs, Runtime-AAA debugs must be enabled on the corresponding PSN node. Here are a few example logs from prrt-server.log:

Machine PAC generation:

<#root>

```
DEBUG,0x7fd5332fe700,cntx=0001162745,sesn=mgarcarz-ise14/223983918/29245,CPMSessionID=0A3E946D00000FE51
```

Using IID from PAC request for machine

,EapFastTlv.cpp:1234

```
\texttt{DEBUG,} 0x7 fd 5332 fe 700, \texttt{cntx} = \texttt{0001162745}, \texttt{sesn} = \texttt{mgarcarz-ise14/223983918/29245}, \texttt{CPMSessionID} = \texttt{0A3E946D00000FE51}
```

Adding PAC of type=Machine Authorization

,EapFastProtocol.cpp:3610

DEBUG,0x7fd5332fe700,cntx=0001162745,sesn=mgarcarz-ise14/223983918/29245,CPMSessionID=0A3E946D00000FE51 Generating Pac, Issued PAC type=Machine Authorization with expiration time: Fri Jul 3 10:38:30 2015

PAC request approval:

#### <#root>

INFO ,0x7fd5330fc700,cntx=0001162745,sesn=mgarcarz-ise14/223983918/29245,CPMSessionID=0A3E946D00000FE51
PAC request approved for PAC type - Requested PAC type=Machine
,EapFastProtocol.cpp:955
INFO ,0x7fd5330fc700,cntx=0001162745,sesn=mgarcarz-ise14/223983918/29245,CPMSessionID=0A3E946D00000FE51
PAC request approved for PAC type - Requested PAC type=Machine Authorization
,EapFastProtocol.cpp:955

PAC validation:

<#root>

DEBUG,0x7fd5330fc700,cntx=0001162499,sesn=mgarcarz-ise14/223983918/29243,CPMSessionID=0A3E946D00000FE51 Authorization PAC is valid ,EapFastProtocol.cpp:3403 Eap,2015-07-03 09:34:39,208,DEBUG,0x7fd5330fc700,cntx=0001162499,sesn=mgarcarz-ise14/223983918/29243,CPM Authorization PAC accepted ,EapFastProtocol.cpp:3430

Example of successful summary for PAC generation:

#### <#root>

DEBUG,0x7fd5331fd700,cntx=0001162749,sesn=mgarcarz-ise14/223983918/29245,CPMSessionID=0A3E946D00000FE51 Generated PAC of type Tunnel VIA. Generated PAC of type User Authorization. Generated PAC of type Machir

. Success

Example of successful summary for PAC validation:

<#root>

```
DEBUG,0x7fd5330fc700,cntx=0001162503,sesn=mgarcarz-ise14/223983918/29243,CPMSessionID=0A3E946D00000FE51
PAC type Tunnel V1A. PAC is valid.Skip inner method. Skip inner method. Success
```

## **AnyConnect NAM**

Example for non EAP-Chaining session, Machine authentication without fast reconnect:

<#root>

EAP: Identity requested Auth[eap-fast-pac:

machine-auth

]:

Performing full authentication

Auth[eap-fast-pac:

machine-auth

]:

Disabling fast reauthentication

Example of Authorization PAC lookup (machine authentication for non EAP-Chaining session):

<#root>

Looking for matching pac with iid: host/ADMIN-PC2

Requested machine pac was sen

All states of inner method (for MSCHAP) can be verified from these logs:

<#root>

EAP (0) EAP-MSCHAP-V2:

State: 0

(eap\_auth\_mschapv2\_c.c 731
EAP (0) EAP-MSCHAP-V2:

State: 2

(eap\_auth\_mschapv2\_c.c 731
EAP (0) EAP-MSCHAP-V2:

State: 1

(eap\_auth\_mschapv2\_c.c 731
EAP (0) EAP-MSCHAP-V2:

#### State: 4

```
(eap_auth_mschapv2_c.c 73
```

NAM allows the configuration of the extended logging feature which captures all EAP packets and save them in pcap file. This is especially helpful for Start Before Logon functionality (EAP packets are captured even for authentications which occur before user logon). For feature activation ask your TAC engineer.

# References

- <u>Cisco AnyConnect Secure Mobility Client Administrator Guide, Release 4.0 EAP-FAST</u> <u>configuration</u>
- <u>Cisco Identity Services Engine Administrator Guide, Release 1.4 EAP-FAST recommendations</u>
- <u>Cisco Identity Services Engine Design Guides</u>
- Deploying EAP Chaining with AnyConnect NAM and Cisco ISE
- <u>Technical Support & Documentation Cisco Systems</u>