CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:X/RL:X/RC:X
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A vulnerability in the High Availability (HA) service of Cisco Smart Software Manager On-Prem could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to access a sensitive part of the system with a high-privileged account.
The vulnerability is due to a system account that has a default and static password and is not under the control of the system administrator. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by using this default account to connect to the affected system. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to obtain read and write access to system data, including the configuration of an affected device. The attacker would gain access to a sensitive portion of the system, but the attacker would not have full administrative rights to control the device.
Cisco has released software updates that address the vulnerability described in this advisory. There are no workarounds that address this vulnerability.
This advisory is available at the following link:
https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-on-prem-static-cred-sL8rDs8
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Vulnerable Products
This vulnerability affects Cisco Smart Software Manager On-Prem releases earlier than 7-202001 if the High Availability (HA) feature is enabled. HA is not enabled by default.
Determine Whether High Availability Is Enabled
The HA feature must be enabled for Cisco Smart Software Manager On-Prem to be affected by the vulnerability described in this advisory. To determine whether the HA feature is configured on a device, administrators can log in to the administrative web interface and look for the presence of the High Availability Status widget in the main dashboard. If the widget exists, HA is enabled. Administrators can also SSH to the system, enter onprem-console at the prompt, and issue the ha_status command at the CLI.
The following example shows the CLI output when HA is enabled:
[admin@SSM-On-Prem ~]$ onprem-console
SSM On-Prem Console
>> ha_status
Last login: Wed Feb 5 16:35:31 UTC 2020 on pts/0
Cluster name: master
Stack: corosync
Current DC: primary-node (1) (version 1.1.19-8.el7-c3c624ea3d) - partition with quorum
Last updated: Wed Feb 5 16:35:40 2020
Last change: Fri Jan 17 15:16:00 2020 by root via crm_attribute on primary-node2 nodes configured
12 resources configuredOnline: [ primary-node (1) secondary-node (2) ]
Full list of resources:
Clone Set: ipv6nat-clone [ipv6nat] (unique)
ipv6nat:0 (ocf::heartbeat:docker): Started primary-node
ipv6nat:1 (ocf::heartbeat:docker): Started secondary-node
Resource Group: master
redis (ocf::heartbeat:docker): Started primary-node
backend (ocf::heartbeat:docker): Started primary-node
gobackend (ocf::heartbeat:docker): Started primary-node
central_logger (ocf::heartbeat:docker): Started primary-node
frontend (ocf::heartbeat:docker): Started primary-node
Master/Slave Set: postgres_clone_data [db]
db (ocf::heartbeat:docker): Slave primary-node
db (ocf::heartbeat:docker): Slave secondary-node
Slaves: [ primary-node secondary-node ]
promotetomaster (ocf::heartbeat:promotefile): Started primary-node
recovermaster (ocf::heartbeat:recoverfile): Started secondary-node
virtual_ip (ocf::heartbeat:IPaddr2): Started primary-nodeThe following example shows the CLI output when HA is not enabled:
[admin@SSM-On-Prem ~]$ onprem-console
SSM On-Prem Console
>> ha_status
[sudo] password for admin:
Last login: Wed Feb 5 16:01:01 UTC 2020 on cron
Error: cluster is not currently running on this nodeProducts Confirmed Not Vulnerable
Only products listed in the Vulnerable Products section of this advisory are known to be affected by this vulnerability.
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Cisco Smart Software Manager satellite and Cisco Smart Software Manager On-Prem are the same product. Prior to Release 7.0, this product was named Cisco Smart Software Manager satellite. As of Release 7.0, this product has been named Cisco Smart Software Manager On-Prem (SSM On-Prem).
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There are no workarounds that address this vulnerability.
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Cisco has released free software updates that address the vulnerability described in this advisory. Customers may only install and expect support for software versions and feature sets for which they have purchased a license. By installing, downloading, accessing, or otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to follow the terms of the Cisco software license: https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/end-user-license-agreement.html
Additionally, customers may only download software for which they have a valid license, procured from Cisco directly, or through a Cisco authorized reseller or partner. In most cases this will be a maintenance upgrade to software that was previously purchased. Free security software updates do not entitle customers to a new software license, additional software feature sets, or major revision upgrades.
When considering software upgrades, customers are advised to regularly consult the advisories for Cisco products, which are available from the Cisco Security Advisories and Alerts page, to determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution.
In all cases, customers should ensure that the devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and confirm that current hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, customers are advised to contact the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or their contracted maintenance providers.
Customers Without Service Contracts
Customers who purchase directly from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco service contract and customers who make purchases through third-party vendors but are unsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through their point of sale should obtain upgrades by contacting the Cisco TAC: https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/support/web/tsd-cisco-worldwide-contacts.html
Customers should have the product serial number available and be prepared to provide the URL of this advisory as evidence of entitlement to a free upgrade.
Fixed Releases
Cisco fixed this vulnerability in Cisco Smart Software Manager On-Prem releases 7-202001 and later.
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The Cisco Product Security Incident Response Team (PSIRT) is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use of the vulnerability that is described in this advisory.
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Cisco would like to thank Steven Van Loo of hIQkru for reporting this vulnerability.
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To learn about Cisco security vulnerability disclosure policies and publications, see the Security Vulnerability Policy. This document also contains instructions for obtaining fixed software and receiving security vulnerability information from Cisco.
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Version Description Section Status Date 1.0 Initial public release. — Final 2020-February-19
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